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 The Arab Spring has seen North African and Middle Eastern youth organizing against the 
status quo and challenging what they perceive as political, economic, and social injustices. In 
Morocco, while the Arab Spring may not have been as substantial as in neighboring countries, 
demonstrations are still occurring nearly everyday in major cities like Rabat as individuals 
protest issues including government transparency, high unemployment, and, for specific interest 
of this paper, the marginalization of the Amazigh people. The Amazigh, also popularly referred 
to as Berbers in most Western academia and literature, are regarded as the original inhabitants of 
Morocco and the rest of the Maghreb before the introduction of Arabic in the 7th century.1 This 
was only further complicated by the introduction of French colonialism and their issued dahir, an 
attempt at separating the Arabs and Amazigh by having each population adopt its own separate 
laws, and the subsequent rise of Arab nationalism. Since then, Amazigh actors argue that their 
culture has been historically underrepresented by the Morocco regime and that their communities 
are economically and politically marginalized. 
 While this marginalization ultimately resulted in a decline in the number of Amazigh 
speakers, as Bruce Maddy-Weitzmen explains, it also caused “a gradual increase in the self-
conscious manifestations of Berber culture and the demands of the Berber groups.”2 This 
increase, he argues, is a result of a “threat factor,” as individuals became more aware of their 
collective Amazigh identity when it was being threatened.3 This increase in Amazigh 
consciousness has manifested itself into an Amazigh movement, a social movement focused 
primarily within cultural and linguistic grounds rather than political, placing importance on both 
                                                 
1 Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, The Berbers (Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA). 3. 
2 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North Africa,” The Journal 




recognizing the impact of Amazigh culture on Moroccan history as well as the importance of the 
Amazigh language, commonly referred to as Tamazight. The movement has been successful in 
some respects, placing enough pressure on the regime to create the IRCAM, the first government 
institution dedicated to Amazigh culture, and to have Tamazight recognized as an official 
language of the state in the new Constitution. In the context of the Arab Spring and larger Berber 
awakening throughout North Africa, the Amazigh movement is continuing to gain more traction 
as more and more Amazigh associations form and coordination with Berber groups in other 
countries has given the movement a transnational scope.4 
 It is this transnational dimension to the movement that I have decided to explore for my 
independent research project. Although the Amazigh movement puts forward an image of them 
as a united population, it is evident that the Berbers are “not a homogenous group... [and] 
constitute a ‘bewildering number of cultures, economies and physical characteristics.’”5 While 
Berbers exist throughout Morocco, constituting an estimated 40 to 45 percent of the population6, 
they historically have been separated geographically into the rural parts of three distinct regions: 
the northern Rif, middle Atlas, and souther Souss. Yet, it is worth noting that the majority of 
demonstrations and actions undertaken by the Amazigh movement have happened in the urban 
sphere and big cities like Rabat, Casablanca and Agadir. Furthermore, the Berber population is 
not only separated geographically within Morocco, but also across borders as a significant 
portion of the large Moroccan diaspora abroad identify as Amazigh. However, this does not seem 
to hamper the movement, as any online search for the Amazigh movement will give you links to 
websites such as tamaynutfrance,org, amazigh.nl and tamazgha.org, all websites/associations in 
                                                 
4 North-west Africa’s Minority: Springtime for Them Too?, http://www.economist.com/node/21525925. 
5 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North Africa,” The Journal 
of North African Studies, Vol. 6 No. 3 (Autumn 2001). 27. 
6 Ibid. 23. 
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Europe and the United States established by the Moroccan diaspora to support the Amazigh 
movement. These associations have been established along with a rise in interest towards 
Amazigh identity among young Europeans of Morocco descent who, as Anja van Heelsum 
explains in the case of the Netherlands, “are very conscious of the difference between them and 
others.... [and this] has provoked them to look for another self-determination.”7 
 Thus, for my research project I have studied the urban/rural shift in the Amazigh 
movement as well as the effects of migration, both urban to rural and immigration to the Western 
world, on Amazigh identity. The Amazigh movement may be a social movement dedicated to 
preserving the culture and rights of a traditionally marginalized and rural population, but it is 
clear that the methods that the movement uses are much better suited to the urban than rural 
sphere. This shift would have to be associated with migration; by emigrating from the rural areas 
to Moroccan cities and other countries, the movement and the nature of the Amazigh people 
themselves has changed. By spending time in both urban (Agadir) and rural (Al Hoceima) areas 
associated with the Berber community, and by researching the Amazigh diaspora, I have come to 
better understand the relationship between two Moroccan realities: the Amazigh and migration. 
In effect, the urban and rural divides found in the Amazigh movement are perpetuated by 
migration, as rural Berbers migrate to the urban sphere where better resources and education give 
them the tools to develop stronger identities and commitments to the Amazigh movement.
                                                 
7 Anja van Heelsum, “Explaining trends, developments and activities of Moroccan organisations in the 
Netherlands,” Sociaal Wetenshappelijke Studiedagen 30-31 May 2002. 11. 
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Methodology: Methods and Limits: 
 In studying what differentiates the urban and rural Amazigh movements and the effects 
of migration on Amazigh identity, I decided to conduct a series of in-depth interviews with 
Amazigh actors in Agadir, Al Hoceima, and the United States. These interviews varied in length 
and topics addressed depending on the subject and the general course of the interview, but they 
all shared the general theme of defining identity, discussing the role of the Amazigh movement, 
and getting their thoughts on the role of migration on Moroccan and Amazigh society. In the end, 
I was able to conduct eight interviews that I deemed informative, structured, and worth analyzing 
for this research paper. 
 While I had originally anticipated on interviewing more subjects, I found that fewer, yet 
more substantive interviews were more useful for two reasons: the personal nature of the subject 
matter and the general availability of subjects. Nearly all of my interviews were several hours 
long simply due to the complexity of analyzing identity. By not handing out a questionnaire I 
was able to use my base questions and adapt them with more specific follow-up questions 
depending on the course that the interview followed, and this allowed me to get much more 
specific and substantive answers on the role of migration and identity. Furthermore, while it 
would have been helpful to have conducted more interviews in order to draw more concrete 
conclusions, it was difficult to find Moroccans who identified as Amazigh who were willing to 
be interviewed. Especially in Al Hoceima, although many people identified themselves as 
Amazigh they did not consider themselves to be part of any social movement and thus did not 
want to be interviewed. 
 Interviews were conducted in both English and French with the presence and assistance 
of two translators: Abderrahim El Kalloussi, student at the University of Ibn Zohr in Agadir, and 
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Sietske de Boer, Dutch journalist based in Al Hoceima. Although I was not always able to pick 
up every word that was said, I am confident that I understood the general meaning of every 
response that I was given and I only quote direct quotes, not paraphrases, from the subjects. In 
addition, for the sake of linguistic integrity I have decided to keep the language spoken for direct 
quotes. I do not want to directly misrepresent any statement made by any of my subjects through 
my personal translation, so instead I will be keeping the language and including a translation 
next to it in parentheses. 
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Interviews in Agadir: 
 While in Agadir I had the opportunity to interview several students from the University 
of Ibn Zohr who are involved with the Amazigh movement. In our interviews I used a 
combination of questionnaires, follow-up questions and observations to reach my conclusions. 
Through our conversations I was able to get a better understanding of the role of the movement 
both in the university and urban sphere, as well as their own involvement and how they identify 
as Amazigh. To protect anonymity I will be referring to each student’s name with a random 
pseudonym. 
 Firstly, I met with two students, Ahmed and Jamal, to have a more informal interview 
over coffee at a café near the university’s neighborhood. Ahmed and Jamal are both third year 
Sociology at the University of Ibn Zohr who identify as Amazigh and are part of the Amazigh 
movement. Before I was able to ask any of my own specific questions, Jamal began with a strong 
statement: “l’identité de Maroc c’est Amazigh.”8 (“Moroccan identity is Amazigh.”) When I 
followed up his statement asking for clarification, my translator Abderrahim chimed in and said 
that Moroccan identity is mixed and that there is no way to argue that there is just one Morocco. 
At this, Ahmed countered that Abderrahim was thinking along the lines of Paul Poskan’s frame 
of “l’identitié complexe,” and that while Morocco is made up of many different rural societies, 
that “sa societé pure c’est Amazigh.”9 (“its pure society is Amazigh.”) Jamal went further in 
saying that essentially all rural societies in Morocco are Amazigh as well. According to him, 
Saharans are also Amazigh, but their community lost their identity and language along the way. 
 For Ahmed, an Amazigh individual is someone who loves his land, his region and his 
country. Ahmed loved the rural region of Tinghir, but infrastructural differences between the 
                                                 
8 Jamal, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
9 Abderrahim, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
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urban and rural areas pushed him and many other students to Agadir to better their lives. Both 
poverty and the political and social climate in Tinghir affected his decision to immigrate to 
Agadir, and Jamal added that another big problem is the poor education available in rural areas. 
 Even though both acknowledged that the Constitution’s recognition of Tamazight as a 
national language was an important step, neither of them seemed very impressed. As Ahmed 
stated, the language of the Constitution itself continues to marginalize the Amazigh as it sets a 
hierarchy where Arabic still ranks as the first language and Tamazight as the second official 
language. Furthermore, there is no timeline for the language to be instituted throughout Morocco. 
Even though “Tamazight c’est la langue des peuples Nord-Africains,” (“Tamazight is the 
language of the North African people”) you still can’t find it in government buildings or other 
Moroccan institutions, and the Constitutions’s stipulation that it will be adopted in a gradual 
manner means that there is no guarantee as to when it will be used. 10 
 With the use of these more informal interviews, I gathered good base information in 
regards to the Amazigh movement in Agadir and I was better able to formulate specific questions 
for my subsequent interviews. 
 I later had a series of interviews with three students: Nabil, Rachid and Youssef. All three 
immigrated to Agadir from the Tinghir area, a rural region of the Souss area, to study at the 
University of Ibn Zohr. When asked about why they immigrated, Nabil and Rachid said that the 
lack of a university in Tinghir was the main push factor. As Rachid put it, those living in Tinghir 
suffer many things and thus all students must go to Agadir, Marrakesh, or other big cities for 
their studies. They all agreed that emigration out of Tinghir is a reality amongst all young people, 
and that students from the rural Souss and the Sahara must come to Agadir or other similar cities 
to study as there is no university for them to go to in their region. 
                                                 
10 Ahmed, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
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 When asked what the effects of this emigration were, they also agreed that there were not 
very many effects. Nabil said that there were no negative effects; as he put it, while this 
emigration eliminated young people from rural villages, “cette migration est obligatoire.”11 (“this 
migration is obligatory.”) Youssef seemingly agreed with Nabil, saying that he and other young 
people from Tinghir are obligated to come to Agadir for studies. In addition, all three students 
said that they would consider immigrating to the Western world if given the chance. Youssef 
hopes to immigrate to another country, but he would stay in Morocco if not for the economic 
issues that the country is facing, especially in the rural areas. In his opinion, the first problem in 
Tinghir is economic, and the social and cultural issues are secondary but still important. Nabil 
and Rachid would also immigrate to Europe or the United States, even if it meant leaving the 
country “indefinitely.”12 However, as Rachid put it, they still love their country and hope to help 
it in the future even if they do immigrate. He knows of many young people such as himself who 
were involved in the Amazigh movement at the University of Ibn Zohr who immigrated to the 
U.S., France, and Spain and continue to be involved with the movement in some capacity. 
 In terms of identity, all three definitively said that yes, they do identity as Amazigh. For 
Nabil, the Amazigh are “des gens qui sont libres.”13 (“men who are free.”) Rachid brought in the 
historical nature of being Amazigh, and also said that Amazigh literally means a “free man.”14 In 
addition, all three students separately mentioned the concept of “three” in Amazigh identity. For 
symbolic purposes, the Amazigh have related their identity to three concepts: “l’homme, la terre, 
et la langue,” (“man, land, and language”) which they symbolize by holding up their index, 
                                                 
11 Nabil, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Rachid, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
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middle, and ring fingers. 15 As an Amazigh, they work to protect their identity and these three 
concepts which they hold important to them, and as Youssef put it, “they are ready to give blood 
for their rights.”16 
 They all identified themselves as members of the Amazigh movement, but stipulated that 
there involvement is limited to just the university. As Rachid explained, there are two sections to 
the Amazigh movement: the movement in the university and the movement outside of it. The 
university movement is composed of student groups and demonstrators in all major universities 
throughout Morocco in cities like Agadir, Marrakesh, Meknes and Rabat. According to them, 
although the universities are separated by geography they are jointly organized and share the 
same rhetoric and techniques. Both Nabil and Rachid stressed that the university movement is 
primarily a cultural movement, not cultural, and that they talk about the importance of language 
and the role of Amazigh culture in Moroccan society. Youssef added that the university is an 
“appropriate place” for the movement, and that they use the grounds to organize protests and 
demonstrations.17 Moreover, Rachid said that the main difference between the university 
movement and the larger Amazigh movement outside of the university is that the university 
movement is more organized and employs the same methods, whereas the Amazigh movement 
driven by associations and organizations share different opinions in regards to Amazigh identity 
and the movement and put on different programs. When I asked if that meant that all universities 
shared the same opinions on the Amazigh movement, he answered that yes, they do share the 
same opinions. However, he said, while there are splits between the university movement and the 
movement outside of the university, in the end they share the same goal and “the target is one.”18 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Youssef, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Rachid, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Agadir, Morocco, November 2011. 
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 Next, when asked if and how they were involved with the Amazigh movement back in 
Tinghir, all three stated that they were involved, but that the movement is very different in rural 
areas. When asked how their identity as Amazigh has changed since immigrating to Agadir, they 
all agreed that their perception of being Amazigh has changed. According to Rachid, while in 
university they “find new things, new cultural discussions.... [and they] develop [their] Amazigh 
conscience everyday.”19 Youssef said that being in Agadir has shown him that they have an 
“opportunity to have more.”20 They have learned about Morocco in a new way and they have 
increased their level of thinking and fighting for their culture. Nabil added that he has realized 
more about government suppression in Morocco and its rural areas in particular, and questions 
things more freely now, like why there is still military presence in Tinghir over 4 months since 
the height of the Arab Spring protests. The issue, according to Youssef, is that the educational 
system in Morocco is false. In primary school students learn “wrong histories” that are in favor 
of the government and those in power, and in the university they have the opportunity to “correct 
wrongs and learn new things.”21 Rachid now asks himself questions regarding heritage and 
language, such as if Arabs are obligated to be Muslim and how exactly Islam came to Morocco. 
By asking these questions, he believes that he is working towards finding the reality of the 
Amazigh in Morocco. 
 Regardless of what they perceive as better living conditions in Agadir, all three hope to 
return to Tinghir once they finish their studies. As Youssef explained, if there was a university in 
the region he would have never left and instead would have tried to improve the conditions there.  
In his opinion, the “educational system is on the side of the power in Morocco.”22 In effect, 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 





Youssef believes that the government aims to make the rural region and particularly its young 
people poor. With no university in the rural south, they are obligated to come to Agadir, where 
conditions are better but still poor as the University Ibn Zohr has as many as 60,000 students and 
only 100 professors. Even though the university has helped them challenge Moroccan identity, 
they still feel that there is a sense of government suppression in the university system as teachers 
often refuse to teach certain topics and one cannot question their methods. If one hopes to earn a 
degree and find employment after university, one has to accept the status quo and in a sense, 
“vous êtes obligé d’être un homme d’État.”23 (“you are obligated to become a man of the state.”) 




Interviews in Al Hoceima: 
 While in Al Hoceima I discussed the Amazigh movement with several actors and 
scholars involved with the issue. For this research paper I will be analyzing two of those 
interviews: one with Mr. Omar Lemallam and Mr. Mohammed Mouha. Mr. Lemallam is a 
mathematics professor and former Rifi militant from Al Hoceima who is now president of 
l’Association Mémoire du Rif. The association is primarily cultural and works on preserving the 
history of the Rif region by promoting the region’s traditions, songs and other customs. Mr. 
Mouha is also a former Rifi militant and the former president of l’Association Mémoire 
Collectif. The association is also cultural and focused on preserving Rif history, as well as 
highlighting the history of Jewish-Moroccan relations in the region. 
 Even though I was put in contact with them because they were reportedly important 
Amazigh actors in the region, both insisted that they were actually not part of the Amazigh 
movement. Instead of the Amazigh issue, Mr. Lemallam said that he and his organization are 
focused solely on the historical marginalization of the Rif region and its people. Mr. Mouha 
agreed, repeatedly stating that for personal reasons he had finished his involvement with the 
political Amazigh movement. 
 Mr. Lemallam explained that the Amazigh movement is a social movement that has many 
divides and contradictions. According to him, “il y a le mouvement culturel Amazigh et il y a le 
mouvement militant Amazigh,” (“there is the cultural Amazigh movement and the militant 
Amazigh movement”) and the two are very separate. 24  The cultural movement is comprised of 
the university and its students and Amazigh associations throughout Morocco. Even within this 
section of the movement there are differing opinions. Some members believe that the Moroccan 
people are united, that there shouldn’t be a split between the Arabs and Amazigh and that they 
                                                 
24 Omar Lemallam, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Al Hoceima, Morocco, November 2011. 
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will find a way to get over their differences, whereas others are very adamant that there are 
divides in Moroccan society. Moreover, some actors recognize that there are splits within even 
the Amazigh community; due to geography there are many differences between the Amazigh 
people and the culture of the Rif, Atlas and Souss regions. Regardless of the movement’s 
tendency to unite all Amazigh people, they believe that “nous ne somme pas un peuple.”25 (“we 
are not one people.”) 
 He argued that these splits within the Amazigh community were illustrated by the debate 
over the formation of the Tamazight language. While the Constitution allowed for the 
recognition of the Amazigh language, it never specified which form of the language and instead 
allowed IRCAM to decide. The issue was in regards to the script that would be used as there 
were arguments from different sides to choose Latin (to encourage Western learning), Arabic 
(for nationalist purposes and because it is the only language spoken by all Moroccans) and 
Tifinagh (which has historically been the symbol for the Amazigh language). In the end, 
Tifinagh was chosen, but as Mr. Lemallam explained, it is only really used in the Sahara and 
Souss regions and it is never used in the Rif region. In effect, by trying to unite the Amazigh 
people he argued that this decision actually marginalized the Amazigh population of the Rif. 
 In addition to the cultural movement Mr. Lemallam explained the militant section of the 
Amazigh movement. This section is made up of individuals who want and defend the Amazigh 
community’s right to have its place in Moroccan culture. As he explained, some are in political 
groups and have certain affiliations, but they are not a part of any social movement. They all 
have their own different opinions on the matter and are not affiliated with any organization or 
particular movement. This section of the general Amazigh movement is how Mr. Lemallam 




would characterize his involvement; “il le défend, mais il ne fait pas part de aucun 
mouvement.”26 (“he defends it [the Amazigh issue], but he is not part of any movement.”) 
 Mr. Lemallam acknowledged that there is a difference between social movements such as 
the Amazigh movement in the rural and urban sphere. Since there are no big cities in the rural 
region, people must immigrate to urban areas such as Fes, Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakesh to 
complete their studies and oftentimes to find employment. In a sense, this migration creates 
marginalization as many young people are leaving the region, however in many ways this 
migration is also helpful to the region. By immigrating to better-off regions, individuals from the 
Rif can use the resources available to them to defend the interests of the region. Especially in 
regards to Rif migrants in Europe, they can use the democracy found in countries like Spain and 
the Netherlands to advocate for the region and help ameliorate the conditions of the marginalized 
Rif. 
 Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Lemallam questioned the existence of Amazigh identity 
and the social movement in themselves. While he said that Amazigh identity has a rich history 
and culture, he argued that it’s significance is exaggerated by some people and that their attitude 
that everything good came from the Amazigh is “racist.”27 In his opinion the cultural movement 
at times goes too far and contains many contradictions. In addition to not recognizing the 
differences between the three distinct Amazigh regions, it’s use of the word Amazigh isn’t 
correct. As he explained, there is a historical differentiation between the Amazigh and Berbers, 
as the Berbers are the original inhabitants of Morocco and the Amazigh came later from the 
Middle East, in particular Egypt and Syria. The Amazigh movement has ignored this, he said, 





and grouped together all Berbers and Amazigh into one ethnic group for the sake of the social 
movement. 
 Furthermore, he countered that the popular definition of Amazigh amongst the Amazigh 
movement is not exactly correct. While in Tamazight the word Amazigh translates to “quelqu’un 
qui est libre”28 (“someone who is free”) what it really means in practicality is a man who is free 
in contrast to someone who is not free, or a slave. Instead of using this definition, he argued that 
Amazigh activists have interpreted the definition in a way that better promotes freedom. The 
biggest issue surrounding the Amazigh movement, he argued, is that since it is based on race it is 
too absolute and there is no room for compromise. Mr. Mouha reiterated this by saying that 
within the movement, “question de l’identité et langue berbère ne sont pas négociables.”29 (“the 
issue of Berber identity and language are not negotiable.”) Yet, while Amazigh identity is rich in 
history, according to Mr. Lemallum it doesn’t have very much place in modern Morocco and is 
in fact “une identité imaginaire.” 30 (“an imagined identity.”) 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mohammed Mouha, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Al Hoceima, Morocco, November 
2011. 
30 Omar Lemallam, interview held during SIT Independent Study Project, Al Hoceima, Morocco, November 2011. 
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Interview with American Cultural Association of America: 
 I managed to conduct an interview through Skype with Mr. Hsen Larbi, an Amazigh 
activist from Philadelphia, PA and member of the Amazigh Cultural Association of America. 
The ACAA is a non-profit organization that is “organized and operated exclusively for cultural, 
educational, and scientific purposes to contribute to saving, promoting, and enriching the 
Amazigh (Berber) language and culture.”31 Based in the state of New Jersey, but with members 
across the United States, the organization is composed mainly of Algerian-Berbers, but also has 
many members of Moroccan descent. Its projects are primarily cultural and involve promoting 
Amazigh culture and fostering connections between different Amazigh diaspora groups in the 
United States, with projects including sending flags to and raising awareness of the Libyan-
Amazigh population, supporting Radio Numydia, a North American Amazigh radio station, and 
supporting Tamazight literature and language tools. 
 It is important to preface my findings by stating that Mr. Larbi is actually of Algerian 
descent, from the Kabylie region. While it was not originally my plan to interview non-
Moroccan Amazigh actors, given the transnational nature of the issue and the movement, and the 
fact that my project deals with the impact of migration on identity, I believe that the interview is 
still very much relevant and will shed light on many of my questions. 
 When beginning the interview and asking Hsen about the role of the ACAA, he insisted 
that in addition to keeping good relations between all members of the Amazigh diaspora, that it 
is important for them to get the word out about the role that the Amazigh face in North Africa to 
the greater U.S. community, as in his opinion “the existence of the Amazigh as a people is being 
threatened.”32 This type of rhetoric is very similar to the sort of language used by the university 
                                                 




students that I met with in Agadir, so it was not very surprising when I learned that Hsen 
immigrated to the U.S. from Algeria for university in the 80’s. The reasons were similar to those 
of the Agadir students: bad infrastructure, poor education, and a lack of opportunities in Algeria. 
 Just as in Morocco, immigration is becoming increasingly prevalent in Algeria, and 
according to Hsen for valid reasons. While conditions are poor throughout Algeria, things are 
particularly difficult for the young generation; unable to find employment many of them are 
looking for a way out. This even extends to the educated, as brain drain is a major issue in 
Algeria and many degree holders have left the country for better living conditions in Europe and 
the U.S., including Hsen. As Hsen explained, these young individuals are “the next ones to 
govern the country,” yet they remain marginalized and are forced to live in very bad 
conditions.33 While he himself is not sure if he made the right decision to leave the country, he 
does not regret anything and is constantly reminded by his relatives in Algeria that he made the 
right decision in emigrating. 
 When asked to define Amazigh identity, Hsen stated that it was a good question to ask, 
because as a foreigner it is difficult to recognize the difference between the Arabs and Berbers. 
According to him “when it comes down to it, North Africa really is one place... the borders 
should not really be there but were put in place by colonizers.”34 In his opinion, the people of 
North Africa are almost entirely Amazigh and the region’s culture is also very much influenced 
by Amazigh culture as well. In support of his statement that North Africa is Amazigh, he 
mentioned the Tuareg, a nomadic ethnic group that inhabit Niger’s portion of the Sahara. While 
their culture, which revolved around pastoralism and the desert, is significantly different than 
that of Amazigh in Morocco and Algeria, they share the Amazigh language and are thus Berbers 





who are separated by geography. Consequently for him the defining characteristic of Amazigh 
identity is language. Regardless of the cultural and geographic differences between the Amazigh, 
they all share the same language, which is why the movement has focused on Tamazight as 
much as it has. 
 When asked if and how his time in the United States has impacted his definition of 
Amazigh identity, Hsen is pretty sure that being abroad has helped him “better appreciate what is 
important to us as Amazigh.”35 By separating himself from the reality of the Amazigh situation 
in Algeria, he believes that he better knows what it is to be Amazigh and what it takes to survive 
as an Amazigh people. In effect, he doesn’t know if he has become more aware directly because 
of immigrating or if it is just a result of growing older, but he did concede that he is lucky for the 
amount of information available to him in the United States as opposed to Algeria. Even as a 
university student Hsen hardly had access to any books, but in Philadelphia he can go to the 
University of Pennsylvania library, which has books on many subjects and in all types of 
languages, many of which are relevant to the Amazigh issue in North Africa. This, he said, has 
“made a huge difference” in his perception of being Amazigh and has made him more aware of 
the marginalization that his community is subjected to in his home country.36 
 It is for this reason that Hsen believes that the borders and separations present in the 
Amazigh movement have actually been helpful for the cause. In some ways he concedes that the 
separations have had some negative impacts on the centrality of the movement and its message, 
but in his opinion the borders (physical, geographic, and cultural) are “historical facts that we 
have to accept.”37 Migration has been positive in many ways for the Amazigh as it has both 
improved living conditions for the Amazigh people and helped the movement gain traction. 






While emigration results in an immediate loss on capital due to brain drain, in his opinion the 
end result is positive due to remittances. According to him “you can go to any Amazigh region in 
North Africa and find the effects of migration and diasporas.”38 Furthermore, Amazigh diasporas 
create awareness; through organizing Hsen believes that the ACAA can draw attention to the 
issues faced by the Amazigh people and hopefully influence U.S. foreign policy in North Africa. 
While he didn’t seem very optimistic about the U.S. stepping in and addressing Amazigh 
marginalization due to relations with the Moroccan and Algerian regimes, he did bring up the 
fact that it was the Algerian diaspora in France which mobilized the Algerian war many years 
ago. In addition, immigration has allowed for Amazigh communities who were separated by 
borders during colonialism to unite again and organize together. While the Moroccan/Algerian 
border has been closed for years and blocked contact between Amazigh groups in their 
respective countries, immigration has allowed for their populations to meet again and mobilize, 
creating institutions such as the ACAA and the World Amazigh Congress.





 When analyzing the data I collected from my interviews and personal observations, it is 
difficult to draw upon concrete conclusions given the low number of subjects as well as the 
nuance and complexity of some of the answers that I received. However, I do feel that my 
information is sufficient enough to address some of the central trends and themes that have 
appeared consistently. 
 First, all subjects agreed that the Amazigh movement is not homogenous, and instead is 
composed of many different factions. While there was some disagreement, as Mr. Lemallam 
grouped the university movement with Amazigh associations, which the students insisted was 
separate from the university movement, it is clear that there is no one single Amazigh movement. 
Students, associations and militants are all involved with the Amazigh issue to some capacity 
with the same general goal in mind (preserving the rights and integrity of the Amazigh 
population), but the way they go about interpreting that goal and how the plan to achieve it can 
be completely different. In effect, it is perfectly possible for one to be political and Berber, yet 
still not a part of the larger Amazigh movement. 
 This seems to be due to the nature of the social movement itself: it is difficult to maintain 
harmony and a central message for a population that totals nearly half of a country’s population. 
When I initially conducted my interviews I was marveled at the consistency in answers that I 
received from the university students. Not only were their general answers the same, but even the 
language that they used was nearly identical when I asked them about Amazigh identity and 
migration. However, after going to Al Hoceima and getting a chance to analyze my data, it 
became clear that their responses were similar due to their belonging to the same part of the 
Amazigh movement: the university. Had any of them not been a university student it is fair to 
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wonder how their responses would have differed. Because of the fundamental differences 
between them and the other three subjects (age, region of origin, faction of the Amazigh 
movement), they interpreted Amazigh identity differently than the others, even though they all 
share the same identity in theory. This explains how the university students interpreted the term 
Amazigh to mean a free man, whereas Mr. Lemallam saw it as just meaning someone who is not 
enslaved. 
 Second, the interviews support the notion that migration has had an effect on their 
Amazigh identities. In particular, it seems that their studies at the university have been the most 
definitive factor in shaping their identity as urban Berbers. Although every student said that they 
were involved with the Amazigh movement before coming to Agadir, their involvement and 
rhetoric against the Moroccan regime has intensified while in the urban sphere. Their education 
at the university has taught them to question their identities as Moroccan and Amazigh, and they 
have learned new things about their country that they believe were not covered before university. 
They now have a better sense of what it means to be Amazigh and they are continuously learning 
new things and challenging their identity and the status quo. In some ways, it seems as if 
immigrating to the urban sphere is an essential part of being Amazigh. Many of the students 
discussed their migration as obligatory, as if it was they had no other choice or it was their duty 
to come to Agadir for studies. If this migration really is as obligatory as they described and if it 
has helped them develop their Amazigh conscious, I believe that one could argue that in order to 
be Amazigh one has to migrate to the urban sphere to develop a more complete identity. 
 While conducting my research in Agadir and Al Hoceima I had the chance to explore 
both cities and make my own observations based on daily life and casual conversation. If there 
was anything that distinguished the two areas I would say that the population was more willing 
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to address the Amazigh issue in Agadir than in Al Hoceima. In my opinion, Agadir 
acknowledged its Amazigh culture more openly than in Al Hoceima. Not only were there 
museums and institutions dedicated to Amazigh culture, but it was also very easy to come across 
Tifinagh on signs and buildings when walking down a street. While one could still find traces of 
Amazigh culture in Al Hoceima, it was nowhere near as evident. In addition, I had a much easier 
time finding Amazigh actors who were willing to discuss identity and the movement with me in 
Agadir than in Al Hoceima. Granted, I had more people available at my disposal in Agadir due 
to my connections with the University Ibn Zohr, but even the few people who I got in contact 
with in Al Hoceima who were supposedly big Amazigh actors were either hesitant or 
uninterested. Not only did both of the subjects refuse to acknowledge themselves as part of the 
Amazigh movement, but I also had several interviews canceled and was told point-blank by 
others that they had nothing to do with the Amazigh, even though I was assured that they were 
once very much involved with the movement. 
 This difference could be the result of many factors, but when taken into account with the 
responses I received during my interviews, I would guess that answer lies in the urban and rural 
divide. As the interviews highlighted, by going to the urban sphere and particularly having 
access to more information and the university, both the university students and Hsen from the 
ACAA learned to understand the issues they faced in their places of origin and how to better 
articulate their problems. I would attribute this to the concept of threat factor mentioned before; 
by moving to the urban sphere where they are no longer the majority and are more obviously 
surrounded by the makhzen and government establishments, individuals become more aware of 
their differences and are more willing to defend and honor them. As David Crawford explains, in 
his experience working with rural Berbers, “while villagers might agree on the existence of many 
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of the problems noted by activists, they do not commonly associate their experience of those 
problems with being Amazigh.”39 Whether truthful or not, the Amazigh have seemingly become 
more aware of the state’s role in marginalization by migrating away from their rural regions, and 
have used the resources available to them in the urban sphere, such as technology and education, 
to question and challenge authority. 
 Third, I believe that it is important to note that involvement with the Amazigh movement 
is a seemingly lifelong commitment. While both Mr. Lemallam and Mr. Mouha insisted that they 
were not a part of the Amazigh movement, I think that it is still fair to say that although they may 
no longer be an active part of the organized movement, by simply being individual militants they 
are furthering the Amazigh cause. As the students and activities of the ACAA show, immigration 
does not mean an end with one’s involvement with the movement, but rather just a different 
avenue of approaching it. The students have found a way to remain even more involved with the 
cause when hundreds of kilometers away from Tinghir, and perhaps most importantly they all 
plan to return to and help their region when done with their studies. Although Hsen did not show 
much interest in returning to Algeria, he has found a way to continue advocating for the 
Amazigh even while across the ocean, and he continues to make trips to his country and works 
tirelessly in advocating for them and their rights. If anything, migration does not set borders 
separating the Amazigh movement, but instead it has caused reevaluation and amplified their 
personal identities and involvement. 
                                                 





 In effect, the urban and rural divides found in the Amazigh movement are perpetuated by 
migration, as rural Berbers migrate to the urban sphere where better resources and education give 
them the tools to develop stronger identities and commitments to the Amazigh movement. 
Neither the Amazigh movement nor Amazigh identity can be easily defined; both are complex 
constructs that have different meanings depending on the context, speaker, and audience. What is 
clear is that the Amazigh movement is only gaining momentum in Morocco and the rest of North 
Africa, and that Berbers are not allowing their economic and social marginalization to hold them 
back, and instead are using human mobility to go to where the resources are rather than waiting 
for the resources to be given to them. Regardless of the divides present in the movement between 
different regions, groups, and individual actors, their end goal is the same and migration is one of 
the best tools they have to develop their movement. 
 If given the time and resources necessary to conduct more research, I would suggest that 
any follow-up project include a dimension on studying the existence of Amazigh identity in 
itself. I touched on the subject by asking the subjects to give a general definition of Amazigh, but 
along the way I still questioned what Amazigh really meant and what purposed it served. While I 
do not have enough evidence to either support or disprove this statement, I was interested in 
Omar Lemallam’s belief that Amazigh is an imagined identity. This statement came just hours 
after Sietske de Boer and I had a conversation on imagined identities and her interest in studying 
if Amazigh identity is merely a social invention after being forwarded a scholarly article on the 
matter.40 While Maddy-Weitzman argues that the influence of colonialism on Amazigh identity 
is not enough “to say that modern Berber/Amazigh identity has been constructed, ‘imagined’ or 
                                                 
40 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993. 
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‘invented’ out of whole cloth,” if the French dahir is so fundamentally important to the creation 
of Amazigh identity as it seems to be, I believe that the question is worth researching.41 
                                                 
41 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North Africa,” The Journal 
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